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JOSEPH A. ROHNER IV*
Catholic Diocese Sexual Abuse Suits,
Bankruptcy, and Property of the
Bankruptcy Estate:  Is the “Pot of
Gold” Really Empty?
On July 6, 2004, something happened that had never previ-ously occurred in the history of the United States of
America—a Catholic diocese sought the protection of the United
States Bankruptcy Court.  Facing enormous potential debts from
pending lawsuits, the Archdiocese of Portland, Oregon became
the first diocese to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.1  It
would not be the last.  In September 2004, the Diocese of Tucson,
Arizona followed suit by filing its own petition for Chapter 11
protection.2  The Diocese of Spokane, Washington announced in
November 2004 that it would be the third diocese to file and
made good on the promise a few weeks later.3
The events that led up to the Portland Archdiocese’s filing
foreshadowed the filing of those dioceses to come.  Years of set-
tlements stemming from alleged sexual abuse, a large number of
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2006.  Executive Editor,
Oregon Law Review , 2005-06.  I would like to thank Professor Andrea Coles-Bjerre
for suggesting the topic of this paper and for her guidance in the drafting stage.  I
also extend personal thanks to Kerry Rohner for her love and support, and to Jay
Slocum for his timely contributions.
1 Aviva L. Brandt, Portland Archdiocese Files for Bankruptcy–Prelate Cites Costs
of Abuse Suits, but Plaintiffs say He is Bluffing , STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July
7, 2004, at 3.
2 Arthur H. Rotstein, Diocese Files for Bankruptcy; Tucson Bishop Cites Abuse
Cases , SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at A5.
3 Janet I. Tu, Spokane Diocese Files Bankruptcy , SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at
B1.
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similar cases that remained unsettled and potentially ready to go
to trial, and the reluctance of insurance carriers to pay for further
settlements all contributed to the bankruptcy filings.  Portland
Archbishop John G. Vlazny summed up the position of his  arch-
diocese and the others that have filed for bankruptcy so far:
“The pot of gold is pretty much empty right now.”4
Attorneys for Portland-area plaintiffs who have filed suit
against the Portland Archdiocese have publicly scoffed at the
claim that the archdiocese is out of money.  For instance, attor-
ney David Slader stated, “[t]he archdiocese is one of the wealthi-
est corporations in Oregon,”5 and claimed that the Portland
Archdiocese alone owned more than $500 million in tax-assessed
properties.6  The basis for the discrepancy between Slader’s view
and Archbishop Vlazny’s view ultimately stems from two differ-
ent concepts of property ownership—one civil and the other ec-
clesiastical.  Bankruptcy courts have recently held that Slader’s
view will prevail, as will be discussed below, but at the time of the
historic Portland filing, the legal question was truly open and had
never been ruled on.
Before framing the parameters of the bankruptcy law question,
it is important to know what happens when a debtor files for
bankruptcy protection in terms of the protections the federal
Bankruptcy Code erects.  The automatic legal consequences of a
Chapter 11 filing are many.  Upon filing a petition, all efforts to
collect debts that have arisen before the filing of a bankruptcy
petition are immediately stayed, as per 11 U.S.C. § 362.  Bank-
ruptcy’s so-called “automatic stay” is powerful enough to tempo-
rarily stop pending civil lawsuits and trials, including certain
sexual abuse trials against the Portland Archdiocese.7  The auto-
matic stay is a so-called “breathing spell,” which stops creditors
from financially dismantling the debtor’s assets and helps to facil-
4 Laurie Goodstein, Oregon Archdiocese Files for Bankruptcy Protection , N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A12.  This quote is, of course, the basis for the title of this
Comment.
5 Aviva L. Brandt, Archdiocese Seeks Bankruptcy Shield , TULSA WORLD, July 7,
2004, at A8.  As for Archbishop Vlazny’s press conference remarks, Slader said:
“The bishop hasn’t begun to touch his pot.  He is lying . . . .” Id.
6 Id.
7 Goodstein, supra  note 4 (“The plaintiff was seeking $130 million in damages
[against the Portland Archdiocese] and said he was determined to have a public
hearing of his case against the church.  But a bankruptcy filing means that the trial is
immediately suspended.”).
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itate an effective reorganization plan.8
Another automatic occurrence is the creation of a bankruptcy
estate.  As the Bankruptcy Code states, “[t]he commencement of
a [Chapter 11] case . . . creates an estate.  Such estate is com-
prised of . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in prop-
erty as of the commencement of the case.”9  The bankruptcy
estate is quite broad and was intended to be so.10  Virtually all of
the assets a debtor owns will become part of the debtor’s bank-
ruptcy estate.  This breadth creates a problem for the dioceses
that have filed for bankruptcy.
Each Catholic diocese has multiple parishes within its geo-
graphical sphere.  Each parish contains various real property
(which will be referred to collectively as “parish property”), such
as churches, seminaries, schools, and the like.  For the most part,
the bishop (in the case of a diocese) or the archbishop (in the
case of an archdiocese) holds the titles to such properties, as well
as cash or liquid financial assets that also ostensibly belong to
each parish.  In addition, each diocese or archdiocese owns spe-
cific real and personal property for its own uses.
Perhaps the most important legal question surrounding the
bankruptcy of a Catholic diocese is this:  who owns the multitude
of parish real and personal property?  Given the ownership struc-
ture of parish lands, for one, the obvious answer is that the dio-
cese owns the property.  Title to property is frequently ownership
of property, which should mean that parish property is part of
the diocese bankruptcy estate.  Yet upon deeper inspection, the
legal waters begin to muddy.  Catholic canon law holds that par-
ish property belongs to the parishes themselves, not the diocese
that holds the civil legal title.11  Whichever view is legally correct
will have a potentially dispositive impact in diocese bankruptcy
cases.
8 See United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993); In
re  Amcor Funding Corp., 117 B.R. 549, 552 (D. Ariz. 1990); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595,
at 340 (1977), reprinted in  1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 1977 WL 9628 (“The automatic
stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.
It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors.”).
9 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
10 See, e.g. , United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05 (1983) (“The
House and Senate Reports on the Bankruptcy Code indicate that § 541(a)(1)’s scope
is broad.”); In re  Chappel, 189 B.R. 489, 493 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (“The legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Code reveals that the concept of property of the estate is
to be interpreted broadly.”).
11 See infra Part II.B.
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Determining actual ownership is vitally important for each
Chapter 11 reorganization plan a diocese files.  If parish property
is truly owned by individual parishes, the property will not be-
come part of the bankruptcy estate of the diocese and will not be
threatened by creditors’ collection efforts against the diocese.
The dioceses themselves, supported by Catholic canon law, have
claimed that this is the case and that the legal outcome ought to
be in accord with canon law.  If parish property is legally owned
by a diocese, however, the property will be part of the dioceses’
bankruptcy estates because of § 541(a)’s broad mandate.  If this
is the case, each diocese bankruptcy estate will vastly increase in
monetary size, and the amount of money available for creditors
will increase proportionately.
This Comment will discuss arguments for excluding parish
property from the bankruptcy estate of a diocese when the dio-
cese12 files for bankruptcy or, alternatively, to what extent such
property should be part of a diocese’s bankruptcy estate.  The
dioceses’ position that parish property should be excluded from a
diocese’s estate appears to be on weak legal ground.  This result
follows from the current civil law status of parish properties,
which are held in the name of each diocese.  Consequently, the
legal claim that parish property should be excluded from the
bankruptcy estate of a diocese will likely be unavailing.  This re-
sult is largely due to insufficient use of the asset-shielding struc-
tures offered by civil law, such as incorporation.
Part I will trace the recent events leading up to each bank-
ruptcy filing to date, beginning with the Boston Archdiocese’s
financial problems.  This examination will underscore the present
and future need for settled bankruptcy law as it pertains to dio-
cese and parish property.  Part II will look at the relevant provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code, discuss the workings of the
bankruptcy estate, and examine the unique problems posed by
the bankruptcy filing of a diocese.  This Part will also examine
the structure of Catholic canon law as it pertains to the owner-
ship of parish property and the arguments based on canon law
that parish property should be excluded from a diocese’s bank-
ruptcy estate.  Part III will discuss probable bankruptcy outcomes
12 Though there are other legal entities that might find themselves in a similar
position as a bankruptcy petitioner, this Comment will be limited only to questions
surrounding diocese bankruptcies.  Catholic canon law is unique and might there-
fore allow for a different outcome than the laws of another faith, and as such, other
faiths are outside the scope of this Comment.
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for those dioceses that have already filed for bankruptcy.  This
Part will illustrate why keeping parish property out of the bank-
ruptcy estate of each diocese will prove to be a difficult proposi-
tion.  Part IV will discuss the possibility of applying canon law
directly to the bankruptcy cases.  As will become apparent, Su-
preme Court jurisprudence probably forecloses, or at least se-
verely hinders, the direct application of canon law in disputes
involving church law and third parties.  Part V will discuss proac-
tive measures that the dioceses that are already in bankruptcy
court could have taken in years past.  Finally, Part VI will discuss
the preliminary outcomes of the three American dioceses that
have filed for bankruptcy.  Civil law will allow for protection of
parish property should a diocese and its parishes take proactive
steps, like separate parish incorporation.  Ultimately, not taking
these steps will have a negative impact on unincorporated par-
ishes within dioceses struggling with the financial impact of sex-
ual abuse suits.
I
LAWSUITS, SETTLEMENTS, AND UNPRECEDENTED
BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS
A. The Boston Archdiocese Avoids Bankruptcy
A discussion of financial pressures leading dioceses to bank-
ruptcy should begin with the Boston Archdiocese primarily be-
cause recent diocesan financial problems related to bankruptcy
began in Boston in early 2002.13  In December 2002, the now-
infamous Cardinal Bernard Law14 took the then-unprecedented
step of asking for and receiving permission from his archdio-
cese’s financial council to file for bankruptcy if needed.15  Prior
to 2002, the archdiocese had settled abuse claims by eighty-six
13 Peter Wong, Portland, Boston:  A Tale of Two Endings , STATESMAN JOURNAL
(Salem, Or.), July 11, 2004, at 1A.
14 Cardinal Bernard Law led the Boston Archdiocese during this period, and
records have surfaced showing that Law knew that certain abuses were occurring
under his leadership.  Peter Gelzinis, Betrayed by His church, a Man Meets a Sad and
Lonely Ending , BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 23, 2004, at 22.  Rather than exposing abus-
ers, Law reportedly attempted to cover abuse by exiling abusers from the archdio-
cese. Id.
15 Tom Mashberg & Robin Washington, Church Bankruptcy Option OK’d , BOS-
TON HERALD, Dec. 5, 2002, at 1.  Seeking approval from the finance committee
seems to be one of the most important preliminary steps a diocese must take before
filing for bankruptcy. Id. See also CODE OF CANON LAW, 1983 CODE c.1280
(“Every juridical person [including dioceses and parishes] is to have its own finance
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claimants for a reported $10 million.16  At the time press cover-
age intensified, the archdiocese reportedly faced $90 million in
potential liability to settle 450 lawsuits, and insurers were balking
at the prospect of paying for further settlements.17  Things began
to look grim for the archdiocese, and speculation swirled that the
last legal option available might be filing for bankruptcy.18
Eventually, the Boston Archdiocese avoided bankruptcy by
reaching a settlement agreement with a large pool of claimants
for approximately $85 million, which was financed by selling a
forty-three-acre tract of land owned by the archdiocese itself to
Boston College for a reported $99.4 million.19  This tract also
contained the archbishop’s former residence.20  In what some
consider to be a related move, the archdiocese has begun imple-
menting a plan of parish and parochial school closures in the
Boston area, which, coupled with the sale of those parish’s assets,
is ultimately expected to net out to the closure of sixty-five par-
ishes.21  The archdiocese claimed that these closures were
planned before the settlement, but a few vocal parishioners were
skeptical because the closures and sales occurred so close to the
settlement.22  This set of parish closures and asset sales will be
revisited later in this Comment in the discussion of canon law’s
committee, or at least two counsellors, who are to assist in the performance of the
administrator’s duties . . . .”).
In published reports, there seems to be some dispute as to whether the approval
of the Vatican itself is needed. See  Mashberg & Washington, supra . But see  Alan
Gustafson, Portland Archdiocese Files for Bankruptcy , STATESMAN JOURNAL  (Sa-
lem, Or.), July 7, 2004, at 1A (“[Portland Archbishop John G.] Vlazny consulted
with the Catholic Church hierarchy before filing for bankruptcy.  Church officials
declined to say whether ultimate approval came from the Vatican.  Communications
between the Portland Archdiocese and the Vatican are confidential matters . . . .”).
16 Wong, supra note 13.
17 Mashberg & Washington, supra note 15.
18 Jim Barnett & Jeff Kosseff, Boston Archdiocese, Wary of Precedent, Cools to
Bankruptcy , OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), July 20, 2004, at A1.
19 Id.  There have been minor discrepancies in the published reports of the exact
dollar amounts and acres of land involved in this sale.  One article placed the acre-
age at forty-six acres and the dollar amount at $107 million. See Joseph A. Reaves,
Boston Archdiocese Escapes Bankruptcy , ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix), June 17, 2004,
at B6.
20 Ellyn Ferguson, Portland Archdiocese May Not Be the Last to File for Bank-
ruptcy , GANNET NEWS SERVICES, July 8, 2004.
21 Barnett & Kosseff, supra note 18.
22 Id.  (“‘Obviously they’re selling off all these buildings to pay for something—
and that’s all from that settlement, the abuse cases,’ said Glen Hannington, an area
lawyer who represents parents of children at St. Peter’s, a school slated for
closure.”).
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effect on implied trust agreements.23  While the land sold to Bos-
ton College consisted of real estate owned entirely by the archdi-
ocese, the closure of parishes and reported assets sales could
potentially be in conflict with canon law and might open other
dioceses to harmful legal arguments.24
Though the financial impact on the Boston Archdiocese was
obviously hefty and those closely involved in the abuse and its
cover-up have paid a high personal price,25 “an end to [the Bos-
ton Archdiocese’s] costly claims might be in sight.”26  Even some
of the plaintiffs who opted out of the large settlement have re-
cently settled their causes of action.27  As such, there is reason to
believe the Boston Archdiocese can avoid bankruptcy.  The same
cannot be said for the Portland Archdiocese.
B. The Portland Archdiocese Files for Bankruptcy
By February 2004, it was becoming clear that the Portland
23 See infra  Part III.A.2.
24 See infra  Part III.A.2.
25 Cardinal Bernard Law, who was largely the focal point of the abuse scandal in
its early days, resigned from his post as Boston Archbishop some ten months before
the $85 million settlement was negotiated by his successor, Archbishop Sean P.
O’Malley.  Reaves, supra  note 19.
Cardinal Law’s infamy has only grown since his resignation.  A stage play based
on several depositions given by Law entitled “Sin:  A Cardinal Deposed” was slated
to run at Wellesley College in May 2004.  Heather Allen & Stephanie Vosk, Play
Based on Cardinal Law’s Testimony Due at Wellesley in May , BOSTON GLOBE,
March 19, 2004, at B6.  The Showtime cable network has cast actor Christopher
Plummer as Cardinal Law in a made-for-cable movie called “Our Fathers.”  Tom
Jicha, Showtime Drama Unforgettably Dramatizes Church Abuse Scandal , SOUTH
FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL (Ft Lauderdale), May 21, 2005, at 1D.
After Law’s resignation, he was appointed by the Pope to the position of Archpri-
est of St. Mary Major Basilica—a move that has angered and disappointed vocal
critics. See  Henry Leo Bolduc, Why a Promotion for Cardinal Law? , ROANOKE
TIMES & WORLD NEWS, June 27, 2004, at 3; Philip M. Neis, Church Rewards Dis-
grace , CAPITAL TIMES & WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL (Madison), July 10, 2004, at
A10.
A few notable former Boston priests, like Paul Shanley and John Geoghan, have
faced criminal charges in connection with abuse.  Wong, supra note 13.  Geoghan
was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Id.  Geoghan’s example should
prove ominous for other alleged clergy abusers now on trial, as Geoghan was mur-
dered in prison last year while serving his sentence. Id.  See also  Gary V. Murray,
Insanity Plea Planned in Geoghan Slaying , WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE,
Sept. 2, 2004, at B7 (noting that Geoghan’s alleged killer was serving a life sentence
for the murder of a gay man in 1988).
26 Wong, supra  note 13.
27 Id.  (“A few claims might go to trial, although four who dropped out of the big
2003 settlement ended up accepting a separate offer from the church of $1.4 million
this year.”).
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Archdiocese was in financial trouble.  Archbishop John G.
Vlazny issued a press release that detailed the scope of Portland-
area sexual abuse lawsuits.28  The number of suits and dollar
figures involved was daunting.  Over a period of fifty-three years
beginning in 1950 and ending in 2003, the archdiocese had paid
out $53 million in settlements—$26 million in church funds, $27
million from private insurance carriers.29  Surprisingly, “[m]ost of
the total amount paid in settlements has been paid [between 2000
and 2004].”30  Forty-eight claims were still pending “alleging acts
that occurred from 18 to 40 years [before 2004].”31
Archbishop Vlazny vowed in his press release to fight vigor-
ously, but his archdiocese’s financial resources were obviously
being strained by the settlement process.  The three main sources
of funds the archdiocese had been using to settle claims were rap-
idly depleting.32  Whether the press release was an attempt to
raise funds or to ease the minds of parishioners, it placed the
financial difficulties of the archdiocese into the public domain
and was a harbinger of things to come.  The number of claims
would increase as would the dollar amounts associated with
them.
In May 2004, the archdiocese began sounding the alarm that
the financial breaking point was approaching.  At that time, fifty-
four claims were pending, and eight were scheduled for trial.33
The plaintiffs’ lawyers stated their belief that the archdiocese was
nowhere near bankruptcy, citing what it claimed at the time to be
in excess of $300 million in land holdings and “untold millions in
cash and investments.”34  Under civil law, virtually all of the
holdings of the 124 Portland-area parishes were in the name of
Archbishop Vlazny—“a fact that makes [the Portland Archdio-
28 Press Release, Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon, Archbishop Releases Local
Data on Misconduct Cases (Feb. 21, 2004), available at  http://www.archdpdx.org/
news2004/feb04/stats-report.html.
29 Id.  The claims included allegations made by 181 individuals against thirty-
seven priests, with seventy-six of the allegations being made against the same two
priests. Id.  The archdiocese also mentioned that it was seeking more money from
insurers for claims already paid. Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.  These three sources were 1) private insurance coverage; 2) an archdiocesan
insurance fund, which had been exhausted and was “operating in the red”; and 3)
other archdiocesan funds not held in charitable trust. Id.
33 Steve Woodward, Archdiocese Says Money for Victims Running Out , OREGO-
NIAN (Portland), May 23, 2004, at A1.
34 Id.
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cese] very rich.”35  Archbishop Vlazny, however, claimed that
under canon law, he merely held these lands in trust for the par-
ish and its parishioners.  He held firm to this position as the dis-
crepancy between canon law and civil law pushed the
archdiocese into federal bankruptcy court.
On July 6, 2004, Archbishop Vlazny issued another press re-
lease stating that the Portland Archdiocese would be the first di-
ocese in the nation to file for bankruptcy.36  Two cases set to go
to trial that day carried large potential liability.  One plaintiff
sought over $25 million in compensatory and punitive damages,
another a staggering $130 million.37  The number of claimants
had also grown.  Archbishop Vlazny felt that since the archdio-
cese had 60 other claims pending, he could not “in justice and
prudence pay the demands of these two plaintiffs.”38  Archbishop
Vlazny had consulted his financial council regarding the decision,
and the council had apparently approved of the filing.39  It is safe
to say that the council’s decision was made easier by the insur-
ance coverers’ refusal to pay for further settlements.40
Comparisons between the Boston and Portland Archdioceses
were inevitable.41  One obvious difference between the two arch-
dioceses could explain why one filed for bankruptcy and the
other did not—Portland’s Archdiocese did not have a $100 mil-
lion parcel of real property immediately at its disposal.  Further-
more, the Portland Archdiocese faced a tremendous amount of
potential debt burden should its contingent liabilities come to
35 Id.
36 Press Release, Archdiocese of Portland in Oregon (July 6, 2004) (on file with
author), available at  http://www.bishop-accountability.org/bankrupt/2004-07-06-
Vlazny-Letter.htm [hereinafter July 6 Letter].
37 Id.  Both of these suits involve “the late Rev. Maurice Grammond, who was
accused of molesting more than 50 boys in the 1980s.  Grammond died in 2002.”
Brandt, supra  note 1.  Reverend Grammond did little to help his legacy before his
death but almost assuredly bolstered the case against himself and his archdiocese
with one extremely callous remark.  Grammond is widely quoted as making the fol-
lowing comment in a 2002 deposition regarding sexual abuse he was alleged to have
committed:  “I’d say these children abused me.  They’d dive in my lap to get sexual
excitement.”  Id.
38 July 6 Letter, supra note 36.
39 Id.
40 Sarah Linn, Archbishop:  Settlements Weren’t Paid; Insurance Refused to Pay
More Victims , COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), Aug. 7, 2004, at C9 (“Litigation is
pending against the insurers, which Vlazny said ceased paying most of the claims
starting in February 2001.”).
41 See, e.g., Wong, supra  note 13.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE405.txt unknown Seq: 10  6-APR-06 12:26
1190 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
fruition.42
The Portland Archdiocese’s bankruptcy filing, furthermore,
claimed assets of just $19 million, with real estate comprising
only $10 million.43  However, if parish property were included in
this calculation, which the Portland Archdiocese did not include
in its filing, the value of its tax-assessed land could jump to $500
million or higher, as estimated by lawyers representing alleged
abuse victims.44  It should therefore be apparent that determin-
ing the actual size of the Portland Archdiocese’s bankruptcy es-
tate will influence the bankruptcy steps to follow.
C. The Tucson Diocese Files for Bankruptcy
Speculation abounded that Portland would not be the last dio-
cese to file.45  The speculation was correct.  The Diocese of Tuc-
son had been considering bankruptcy even before the filing in
Portland46 and followed through by filing for Chapter 11 protec-
tion in late September 2004.47  The Tucson Diocese’s financial
condition appeared to be in worse straits than Portland’s.  “Ac-
cording to its financial statement, the [Tucson D]iocese had $4.65
million in long-term debt and a $7 million deficit in unrestricted
net assets as of June 30[, 2004].”48  As with Portland, however,
the Tucson Diocese did not include parish assets in its bank-
ruptcy filing and, further, did not include them in its reorganiza-
tion plan.49  Unlike Portland, the Tucson Diocese filed its
42 Id.
43 Steve Woodward, Archdiocese Values Land at $10 Million , OREGONIAN (Port-
land), July 31, 2004, at C1.
44 Id.
45 Ellyn Ferguson, Portland Case Could Have Domino Effect , STATESMAN JOUR-
NAL (Salem, Or.), July 8, 2004, at A1 (noting, in particular, the financial vulnerability
of the Tucson Diocese).
46 See generally Disclosure Statement Regarding Plan of Reorganization, In re
The Diocese of Tucson, No. 4-04-04721 (D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Disclo-
sure Statement]; see also Tucson Diocese Considers Bankruptcy, BANKR. CT. DECI-
SIONS, June 29, 2004, at 2 (“The diocese is certainly not the first to talk of filing for
bankruptcy in light of sexual abuse lawsuits.  Most recently, the Boston Archdiocese
considered bankruptcy, but as of yet, no diocese has filed.”).  The diocese had
nineteen sexual abuse lawsuits outstanding, and its insurers had paid over $20 mil-
lion in settlements.  Id.
47 Rotstein, supra  note 2.
48 Id.
49 Michael Clancy, Tucson Diocese Faces Liquidation , ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix),
Nov. 7, 2004, at B1. See also  Disclosure Statement, supra  note 46, at 21 (“The Par-
ish Real Property is not included as property of the Estate of the Diocese nor is it
considered for purposes of the Plan.”).
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Chapter 11 reorganization plan on the same day as its bank-
ruptcy petition—a move some felt would lead to a quicker settle-
ment of the case.50
The size of the Tucson Diocese’s bankruptcy estate is certainly
in dispute.  The diocese listed some “$16.6 million in assets in its
bankruptcy estate, which did not include parishes.”51  An Ari-
zona newspaper tabulated all of the real estate holdings of the
parishes and the diocese, which are held in the name of Bishop
Gerald Kicanas, and estimated that the diocese’s 335 parcels of
land alone were worth “a total full cash value of $46.1 million.
The assessed full cash value is often but not always lower than a
property’s market value.”52  As shown above, the diocese itself
has very few unencumbered assets.  As such, determining the size
of the bankruptcy estate makes for a drastic difference in the
type of reorganization plan that the bankruptcy court would be
able to approve.
D. The Spokane Diocese Files for Bankruptcy
On November 6, 2004, the Diocese of Spokane, Washington
announced that talks to settle twenty-eight sexual abuse claims
against it had failed.53  A major factor listed by Bishop William
Skylstad for the breaking off of the talks, as was the case in Port-
land, was the refusal of insurance companies to pay for further
settlements.54
Less than one week later, the diocese announced that it would
50 Teya Vity, Bankruptcy Filing Breaks New Legal Ground , TUCSON CITIZEN,
Sept. 21, 2004, at A2 (“[The simultaneous filing of a bankruptcy petition and reor-
ganization plan] becomes the framework for a settlement[.]” (quoting University of
Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law professor Jean Braucher)).
51 Stephanie Innes, Kicanas Outlines Financial Resources , ARIZ. DAILY STAR
(Tucson), Nov. 10, 2004, at B1.  This number conflicts with the earlier $7 million
deficit listed above.  Rotstein, supra note 2.  The discrepancy is explained in Innes,
infra note 52.
52 Stephanie Innes, Bankruptcy Won’t Touch Most Assets, Diocese Says , ARIZ.
DAILY STAR (Tucson), July 11, 2004, at A1.  The article went on to list the county
with the most valuable property (Pima County, $29.9 million) as well as the most
expensive individual piece of property (Our Mother of Sorrows Catholic Church,
$3.97 million). Id.
53 Nicholas K. Geranios, Failed Talks May Mean Bankruptcy for Spokane Diocese;
Sex Abuse Victims Asking for Millions , COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), Nov. 6,
2004, at C3.  Each of the twenty-eight suits involved alleged sexual abuse by former
priest Patrick O’Donnell, who was removed from the priesthood in 1986. Id.
54 Id.  (“Insurance companies were not willing to pay the demands of the victims,
which totaled millions of dollars, Skylstad said.  Lawyers for the victims also sought
additional millions from the diocese, which it could not pay, Skylstad said.”).
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be the third diocese to file for bankruptcy.55  At the time of the
announcement, Bishop Skylstad noted that the Spokane Diocese,
though it had fewer claims against it than the Portland Archdio-
cese and was much smaller than the Tucson Diocese, had previ-
ously settled five or six claims for around $300,000 and had spent
in excess of $1 million in attorney’s fees and $440,600 in public
relations expenses.56
After the announcement, the Spokane Diocese made good on
its promise to file for bankruptcy on December 6, 2004.57  Re-
ports indicated that liabilities from suits against the diocese could
total as much as $76 million and that its total liabilities could
reach an overwhelming $81 million.58  The diocese listed only $11
million in assets,59 leaving out the assets of its parishes.  The Spo-
kane Diocese, therefore, is in the same legal position as those in
Portland and Tucson.  Settling the question of the size of the
bankruptcy estate will be crucial.60
E. The Need for Bankruptcy Precedent
Some commentators have expressed surprise at the rate of dio-
cese bankruptcies in the wake of Portland’s historic filing.61  If
recent financial troubles plaguing Catholic dioceses are any indi-
cation, however, Portland, Tucson, and Spokane will not be the
last dioceses to file for bankruptcy protection.  Financial
problems surrounding alleged sexual abuse are not unique to
these three dioceses.
For example, the Diocese of Orange County, California an-
nounced that it had reached a settlement agreement with alleged
sexual abuse victims for a remarkable and then-record $100 mil-
lion, a figure that far surpassed the Boston Archdiocese’s earlier
55 See  Virginia de Leon, Bankruptcy for Diocese; Filing to Stop Sex Abuse Suits
Won’t Close Schools , SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), Nov. 11, 2004, at A1.
56 Id.
57 Tu, supra  note 3.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. See also  Virginia de Leon, Fate of Parishes may Rest with Courts, SPOKES-
MAN-REVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), Dec. 5, 2004, at A1; John Stucke, Diocese Steps into
Uncharted Territory; Interplay of Church, Secular Laws Will Complicate Bankruptcy
Case , SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), Dec. 5, 2004, at A1.
61 Johnathan Martin & Janet I. Tu, Catholic Diocese of Spokane to File for Bank-
ruptcy; Church Faces Claims of Sexual Abuse , SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at A1
(“‘I thought the bishops would sit back and see how smoothly Portland’s went
before they also went into bankruptcy,’ said Fred Naffziger, professor of business
law at Indiana University, South Bend.”).
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$85 million settlement.62  A comparison of this settlement to the
Boston Archdiocese settlement reveals how much larger the Or-
ange County settlement truly is.  The pool of claimants in Boston
consisted of 552 individuals, whereas the pool of Orange County
claimants consisted of only eighty-seven people, which meant
that the average amount received per Orange County claimant
was $1.1 million.63
Orange County’s settlement, if its precedent is repeated in the
larger Los Angeles Archdiocese, could create much greater fi-
nancial liability.  Los Angeles’s Archdiocese is currently attempt-
ing to settle 544 molestation claims, which some have suggested
could lead to a final liability figure of $500 million or more.64
Some have even predicted that the figure for the Los Angeles
Archdiocese could far exceed $1 billion before all claims are
settled.65
As large as the Orange County settlement was, the Diocese of
Covington, Ohio recently reached an even higher settlement
amount of $120 million.66  Indeed, the financial situation brought
on by abuse suits is reaching critical points in several dioceses.
The Dioceses of Davenport, Iowa67 and the aforementioned
Covington, Ohio68 have publicly contemplated bankruptcy.  Ac-
cording to reports, nearly 11,000 people have sued Catholic dio-
ceses since 1950 for alleged sexual abuse.69  One wonders how
long the dioceses’ financial resources for settlements will hold.
Even large settlements like those in Boston, Orange County, and
Covington do not, and likely cannot, cover every potential vic-
tim, as demonstrated by the fact that new sexual abuse suits are
still being filed against the Boston Archdiocese.70
62 William Lobdell & Jean Guccione, Abuse Claims Settlement; Diocese’s Deal
Raises the Bar Across the U.S. , SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 2004, at A1.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Jean Guccione, $1.5 Billion for L.A. Priest Abuses?  Molestation Cases Attorney
Predicts Staggering Total for Legal Claims , L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at A4.  This
article preceded the Orange County settlement.
66 Paul A. Long, Diocese Settles Abuse Case for $120M , CINCINNATI POST, June 4,
2005, at A1.
67 Davenport May Go Bankrupt , NATIONAL CATH. REP., Oct. 15, 2004, at 3.
68 Paul A. Long, Diocese Won’t Rule Out Chap. 11 , CINCINNATI POST, July 8,
2004, at A1.
69 Deborah Zabarenko, Sex-Scandal Could Bankrupt U.S. Churches: Nearly
11,000 Alleged Victims:  Catholic Dioceses Facing Multimillion-Dollar Lawsuit Settle-
ments , NATIONAL POST, Dec. 29, 2004, at A19.
70 10 New Lawsuits Filed for Sex Abuse , PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 6, 2005, at A3.
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The true depth of the cases against dioceses will likely not be
known for some time.  Even if the recent trend of diocese bank-
ruptcy filings does not continue (which seems improbable), those
that have filed to date will be intimately affected by the answer
to the question of parish asset ownership.  As such, certainty of
outcome in bankruptcy law, as much as is possible, will become
increasingly important.  While bankruptcy is only one solution to
financial difficulty, the bankruptcy system must be able to func-
tion quickly, efficiently, and effectively for the benefit of debtors
and creditors alike.  Therefore, it is incumbent on the bankruptcy
courts to set precedents when the opportunity arises as it has in
the current archdiocese cases.  Before the nature of the prece-
dent to be set is clear, one must understand the nature of the
bankruptcy principles involved.  The results reached in the initial
bankruptcy court rulings are in accord with the analysis of this
Comment and will probably remain so unless a higher federal
court decides to weigh in on the issue.
II
THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE AND CANON LAW
A. The Concept of the Bankruptcy Estate
As mentioned above, the filing of a petition for bankruptcy has
several automatic effects.  The most important effect for the pur-
poses of this Comment is the creation of a bankruptcy estate con-
sisting of all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in
property at the time of the filing.71  Determining what property
or interests belong in an individual debtor’s bankruptcy estate is
not typically a dispositive issue.  One can often state with a fair
degree of certainty what legal and equitable interests belong to
the debtor at the time of filing.  Yet the diocese bankruptcy fil-
ings present novel bankruptcy estate issues brought on by the
dioceses’ unique positions.
The monetary size of a diocese’s bankruptcy estate will be cru-
cial to the outcome of a Chapter 11 case because of the relation-
ship between Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Under Chapter 7, or liquidation bankruptcy, all legal and equita-
ble interests of the debtor are brought together by a trustee in
bankruptcy, these assets form the debtor’s estate, as per 11
71 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
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U.S.C. § 541(a),72 and the trustee sells the assets and distributes
the proceeds to creditors.73  Though it is not possible to convert a
diocese’s Chapter 11 case into a Chapter 7 liquidation case invol-
untarily,74 the amount of money each creditor would have re-
ceived if a bankruptcy petition had been filed under Chapter 7 is
of vital importance to the approval of a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion plan.
Chapter 11, or reorganization bankruptcy, is fundamentally
different from Chapter 7.  A Chapter 11 debtor reorganizes its
debt and proposes to pay its creditors over a number of years,
but it retains at least some control over the assets of the debtor’s
estate and keeps its business functioning.75  A debtor that retains
possession of its assets assumes the role of an estate trustee and
retains “all the rights . . . and powers, and shall perform all the
functions and duties . . . of a trustee serving in a case under
[Chapter 11].”76  A Chapter 11 debtor proposes a plan of reor-
ganization, which ultimately must be approved by a bankruptcy
court before it can take effect.77  As 11 U.S.C. § 1129 states, cred-
itors of a Chapter 11 debtor must either accept the plan of reor-
ganization proposed by the debtor78 or,
With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests[,] . . .
each holder of a claim or interest of such class . . . will receive
or retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest
property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is
not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or
retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title
on such a date  . . . .79
This is what is known as the “best interests test,” and if it is not
satisfied, a bankruptcy court cannot confirm a Chapter 11 plan.80
72 See supra  note 10 and accompanying text; 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
73 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 205 (4th ed. 2001).
74 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (“The court may not convert a case under this chapter
to a case under chapter 7 of this title if the debtor is a . . . corporation that is not a
moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, unless the debtor requests such con-
version.”).  A diocese’s incorporation as a “corporation sole” would almost surely
place it in the category of corporations that cannot be involuntarily converted,
namely, a corporation that is not “moneyed.”
75 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra  note 73, at 507-09.
76 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).
77 Id.  §§ 1121, 1129.
78 Id.  § 1129(a)(7)(A)(i).
79 Id.  § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
80 Matt Miller, The Church and Chapter 11 , DAILY DEAL, Aug. 9, 2004.  Miller
writes:
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Creditors of a diocese, therefore, must be paid as much as they
would have been paid under a Chapter 7 liquidation unless they
agree to be paid less.
Consequently, § 541(a), which determines the contents of a
debtor’s bankruptcy estate, combined with a hypothetical calcu-
lation of what creditors would receive under a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion, determines the outer limits of the case in Chapter 11 and,
consequently, the liability of a diocese under Chapter 11.  Ac-
cordingly, calculating the size of a diocese’s estate is likely the
most crucial factor in determining a diocese’s long-term liability
under its reorganization.  Given the wide divergence of the size
of a diocese’s bankruptcy estate when the estate includes parish
property as opposed to when it does not, the outcome of this
question could have the biggest possible impact in diocese bank-
ruptcy cases.
It seems undisputed that each individual bishop or archbishop
is the actual title holder of all parish lands and perhaps more
parish property as well.81  The bankruptcy estate consists of “all
legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”82  How, then, could such parish
property fail to be part of a diocese’s bankruptcy estate?
B. Canon Law on Parish Property Ownership and the
Implications for the Bankruptcy Estate
The basis for the answer offered by each diocese lies within
Catholic canon law, which is the Roman Catholic Church’s code
of religious laws.  In the sense that canon law is a code, a some-
what self-contained and self-referential system of rules that pur-
port to govern,83 the Code of Canon Law is structurally similar to
In any reorganization plan, including a nonprofit, creditors should expect
to receive an amount at least equal to what they would have gotten if an
estate was liquidated.  This is known as the “best interests test.”  “If they
don’t, a Chapter 11 can’t confirm,” says Andrea Coles-Bjerre, a law profes-
sor and authority on bankruptcy at the University of Oregon[ ] School of
Law.
81 The dioceses themselves do not deny that the bishop of each diocese holds the
title to parish property. See, e.g. , Disclosure Statement, supra note 46, at 19 (“Ac-
cordingly, mere legal title to the Parish Real Property which is owned by the Par-
ishes is in the name of the Diocese (or the Bishop).”) (emphasis added).
82 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
83 Others have defined the term “code” as a system composed of “statutes, cases,
and from customs . . . and additions as are deemed by the codifiers necessary to
harmonize and perfect the existing system.  In fact, in making a code, new laws may
be added and old laws repealed in order to constitute a complete system.” BLACK’S
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other codes, such as the federal Bankruptcy Code itself.84  The
Code of Canon Law is the Catholic “Church’s fundamental legis-
lative document[,] . . . [which] must be regarded as the essential
instrument for the preservation of right order, both in individual
and social life and in the Church’s zeal.”85  Each diocese is “gov-
erned by and adheres to Canon Law,”86 and each archbishop or
bishop is required by canon law to so adhere.87
Canon law seems to hold that parish property belongs to par-
ishes, regardless of the civil status of the property, because of the
ontological status of parishes under canon law.  Parishes are de-
scribed under canon law accordingly:
A parish is a certain community of Christ’s faithful stably
established within a particular Church, whose pastoral care,
under the authority of the diocesan Bishop, is entrusted to a
parish priest as its proper pastor.
The diocesan Bishop alone can establish, suppress or alter
parishes. He is not to establish, suppress or notably alter them
unless he has consulted the council of priests.
A lawfully established parish has juridical personality by vir-
tue of the law itself.88
Thus, a bishop establishes parishes and places each parish
under the leadership of a local pastor.  A bishop can suppress or
alter his parishes, but he cannot do so solely at his discretion, and
a lawfully created parish has the status of “juridical per-
LAW DICTIONARY 250 (7th ed. 1999) (citing WILLIAM M. LILE ET AL., BRIEF MAK-
ING AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS 18-19 (3d ed. 1914)).
84 One feature of a legal code is internal cross-references.  The Code of Canon
Law is rife with examples of these. See, e.g. , CODE OF CANON LAW, 1983 CODE c.35
(“Within the limits of his or her competence, one who has executive power can issue
a singular administrative act . . . without prejudice to can. 76 §1 .”) (emphasis added);
id. c.144, § 2 (“The same norm applies to the faculties mentioned in cann. 883, 966,
and 1111 § 1 .”) (emphasis added).
85 CODE OF CANON LAW, 1983 CODE APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION at xiii.
86 Disclosure Statement, supra  note 46, at 19.
87 CODE OF CANON LAW, 1983 CODE c.386, §1:
The diocesan Bishop is bound to teach and illustrate to the faithful the
truths of faith which are to be believed and applied to behaviour. . . . He is
alsoon the homily and catechetical instruction, are faithfully observed, so
that the whole of [C]hristian teaching is transmitted to all.
See also id.  § 1 (“Christ’s faithful, conscious of their own responsibility, are bound to
sho to ensure that the provisions of the canons on the ministry of the word, espe-
cially w [C]hristian obedience to what the sacred Pastors, who represent Christ, de-
clare as teachers of the faith and prescribe as rulers of the Church.”).
88 Id.  c.515, §§ 1-3.
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sonhood”89 in the eyes of canon law.  As such, individual par-
ishes exist as juridical persons—separate legal persons—with
their own “legal status [under canon law] as ‘juridic[al] per-
sons.’”90  A juridical person can be seen, essentially, as a ficti-
tious person created by and recognized under canon law.
The notion of fictional personhood should immediately bring
to mind a prominent type of fictional legal person under civil law,
namely, a corporation.  “A corporation is a legal entity with an
identity or personality separate and distinct from that of its own-
ers or shareholders and must be thought of without reference to
the members who compose it.”91  When speaking of the nature of
a corporation, one will often invoke concepts similar to those
used to describe juridical persons.92  For the purposes of canon
law, therefore, one can understand the nature of a parish by anal-
ogy.  To some extent, parishes are corporations created under ca-
non law.
With an understanding of a parish’s status as a juridical person
and all that the status entails, it becomes clearer why canon law
dictates that the property each parish acquires belongs to that
parish.  Canon law states that “[u]nder the supreme authority of
the Roman Pontiff, ownership of goods93 belongs to that juridical
89 Id.  c.115, § 1 (“Juridical persons in the Church are either aggregates of persons
or aggregates of things.”).
90 Nancy Haught, The Church and Bankruptcy:  An Expert View , OREGONIAN
(Portland), July 31, 2004, at B1.
91 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations  § 2 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
92 For example, on the issue of the lifespan of a juridical person and a corporation,
compare CODE OF CANON LAW, 1983 CODE c.120, § 1 (“A juridical person is by its
nature perpetual.  It ceases to exist, however, if it is lawfully suppressed by the com-
petent authority, or if it has been inactive for a hundred years.”) with  18 AM. JUR.
2D Corporations  § 75 (“A corporation the charter of which does not limit its exis-
tence to a definite period of time continues, as a general rule, in legal contemplation
for the time prescribed by a general statute . . . or until it has been dissolved by some
prescribed method.  A corporation has perpetual existence.”).
93 In using the term “goods,” canon law seems to use the term to cover almost
anything that can be reduced to ownership.  For example, the code refers to
“[i]mmovable goods [land and buildings], precious moveable goods, rights and legal
claims, whether personal or real, which belong to the Apostolic See, are prescribed
after a period of one hundred years.” CODE OF CANON LAW, 1983 CODE c.1270.
Elsewhere, the code states that “[a]nyone who receives goods in trust for pious
causes . . . must inform the Ordinary about the trust, as well as about the goods in
question, both moveable and immovable, and about any obligations attached to
them.” Id. c.1302 § 1.  Consequently, as a term, “goods” is best understood in the
way that “property” is often understood.  “Property” as a term must be qualified by
terms such as “real” or “personal” before one can understand what kind of property
is being discussed.
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person which has lawfully acquired them.”94  Thus, any and all
property acquired by a parish belongs to that parish, not to the
diocese.
One can synthesize this information to arrive at the dioceses’
canon law conclusion.  A diocese is the organization that creates
and oversees the parishes, but after their creation, parishes are
separate legal persons.  When a parish acquires property, such
property belongs to the parish, not to the diocese.  Therefore, the
diocese has no more right to parish property than any other per-
son or entity.  Consequently, the canon law argument would con-
clude, true parish property is not part of a diocese’s bankruptcy
estate since “the Diocese does not have any equitable, beneficial
or proprietary interest in the Parish Real Property.”95
In addition to parish real property held in its name, the Dio-
cese of Tucson argued that the same rationale should apply to
parish funds overseen by the Diocese:
In addition, just as a trustee of a trust acquires bare legal title
to the assets under the trustee’s management and control, so
does the Diocese have bare legal title.  However, just as a trus-
tee of a trust does not acquire any beneficial or equitable in-
terest in the property subject to the trust except as explicitly
provided in the Trust or applicable law, the Diocese has no
beneficial or equitable interest in the Restricted Funds and the
Unrestricted Deposits except to the extent that the Diocese
has also placed unrestricted and restricted assets in the fund.96
Furthermore, once a parish receives parishioner donations, ca-
non law would support the argument that such funds should be
excluded from the bankruptcy estate of the diocese, as well.
“Unless the contrary is clear, offerings made to Superiors or ad-
ministrators of any ecclesiastical juridical person, even a private
one, are presumed to have been made to the juridical person
itself.”97
Thus, a strong canon law argument can be made that the prop-
erty of individual parishes, both real and personal, does not be-
long in a diocese’s bankruptcy estate.  Were canon law
dispositive in bankruptcy, a diocese’s estate would almost cer-
tainly consist of the property that a diocese owns independently
of its parishes and nothing else.  The ultimate effect canon law is
94 Id.  c.1256.
95 Disclosure Statement, supra  note 46, at 19.
96 Id.  at 21.
97 CODE OF CANON LAW, 1983 CODE c.1267, § 1.
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given in bankruptcy remains to be seen, though preliminary re-
sults indicate canon law will receive virtually no direct effect.
Nevertheless, canon law, while perhaps not controlling legal pre-
cedent, will lend credence to at least two civil law arguments that
could help to shield parish property from the bankruptcy estate
of a diocese.  Neither argument, however, seems promising.
III
SORTING OUT THE BANKRUPTCY ARGUMENTS
After examining canon law, it seems that there are two inde-
pendent civil law arguments invited by canon law’s framework as
to why parish property is not diocese estate property.  These ar-
guments have at least some merit under existing civil law and do
not require an explicit call for canon law to apply in place of
federal or state law.  The first argument is that parish property is
held by each diocese in a series of enforceable legal trusts.  If a
trust has civil law effect, then only the right to hold the trust
comes into the bankruptcy estate, not the trust res itself.  The
second argument is that parishes are separate corporate persons
under civil law, and it is only civil law’s failure to recognize the
true nature of the property ownership that would lead one to
believe otherwise.  Each of these arguments will be examined in
turn.  In so doing, it will become clear why the success of either is
dubious or, at the least, uncertain and untested.  An argument
based on enforceable trusts will have some legal merit but could
ultimately prove prohibitively costly.
A. Parish Property Held Only in Trust by the Diocese
Each of the dioceses that have filed for bankruptcy to date
have stated, in one way or another, that the parish property it
holds is not actually owned by the diocese but rather is held in
trust for the parishes.98  This puts the onus on a diocese to for-
ward the reasons for the existence of the trust relationships if
they indeed exist.
98 See Gustafson, supra  note 15 (quoting (Portland’s) Archbishop Vlazny:
“‘Under canon law, parish assets belong to the parish,’ he said.  ‘I have no authority
to seize parish property.’”);  Innes, supra note 52 (“‘By canon law, the bishop, and
therefore the diocese, does not own these properties,’ the Rev. Van Wagner . . . said
Friday . . . . ‘The parish owns the property.  The properties are held in trust for each
of the parishes listed and the parishioners of those parishes.’”).  It seems fairly cer-
tain that the crux of the canon law argument is found in the declaration of Canon
1256. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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The Tucson Diocese explained that it holds parish properties in
the name of the diocese because of civil law’s failure to recognize
the status that canon law confers on parishes.  Since its parishes
are not incorporated separately under civil law, the Tucson Dio-
cese stated that the best way to understand the civil law status of
its parishes is to think of them as “unincorporated associa-
tion[s].”99  Unincorporated associations are incapable of holding
title to real property in Arizona.100  As such, titles to land were
given to the bishop to be held in trust for the parishes.  We may
safely presume that the reasons why other dioceses have avoided
incorporating their parishes are substantially similar and that vir-
tually all parishes of those dioceses that have filed for bankruptcy
are not separately incorporated entities.
There must be reasons why individual parishes are not sepa-
rate corporations.  Perhaps separate incorporation was viewed as
redundant or unnecessary because of the structure of canon
law.101  But the fact remains that titles to land and ownership of
certain parish funds are, within the eyes of civil law, held by the
dioceses that have filed for bankruptcy.  Therefore, there is scant
reason to exclude such property from a diocese’s bankruptcy es-
tate.  If parish property is held by a diocese in a series of legally
recognized trusts, however, it will likely be safe from creditors.
1. Bankruptcy Law on Trusts Held by the Debtor
Section 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code defines the bank-
ruptcy estate, and while its definition is certainly broad, it is not
without exception.  Indeed, § 541(d) contains language that could
be directly applicable to a diocese bankruptcy case:
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement
of the case, only legal title and not an equitable interest . . .
becomes property of the estate under subsection (a) of this
section only to the extent of the debtor’s legal title to such
property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in
such property that the debtor does not hold.102
99 Disclosure Statement, supra  note 46, at 19.
100 Id.
101 The Tucson Diocese’s plan of reorganization underscores this interpretation.
The plan defines “parish real property” as property “for which the Diocese holds
bare legal title[,] . . . no beneficial or other proprietary interest[,] . . . [and] which is
part of the temporal goods of the Parish as a juridic[al] person under Canon Law.”
Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization at 14, In re  The Diocese of Tucson, No. 4-04-04721
(D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2004).
102 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (2000).
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Thus, § 541(d) excludes the beneficial interest of a trust from a
trustee’s bankruptcy estate.  Interestingly, § 541(d)’s language is
quite similar to the basic description of a legal trust.103  Cases
interpreting § 541(d) have stated that it may be interpreted to
apply only to “express or resulting trusts created by the intent  of
the parties.”104  Consequently, if a diocese can show an express
or implied trust created by the intent of itself and its parishes,
§ 541(d) will dictate that only the legal title to parish property
will become part of the estate, not beneficial title to the property
itself nor the right to dispose of it.105
Another exclusion to § 541(a)’s broad bankruptcy estate defi-
nition, 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1), has been held to exclude property
held in trust from the estate of the debtor outright.106  Section
541(b)(1) states, in relevant part, that property of the estate
“does not include . . . any power that the debtor may exercise
solely for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor  . . . .”.107
Depending on a bankruptcy court’s inclination, an argument
based on either §§ 541(b) or (d) could successfully keep property
held in trust out of a diocese’s bankruptcy estate.  Therefore, if a
diocese can establish that a genuine legal trust relationship exists
between itself and its parishes, then the equitable rights to parish
property would not be included in the diocese’s estate, only bare
103 Cf.  76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts  § 253 (2004) (“A TRUSTEE is vested with a LEGAL,
as distinguished from an EQUITABLE, estate, which LEGAL estate EQUITY recognizes
but compels to be used by the TRUSTEE in accordance with the TERMS of the TRUST
and for the BENEFIT of all BENEFICIARIES, present and future.”).
104 See, e.g. , In re  Commercial Fin. Serv., Inc., 268 B.R. 579, 598 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 2001).
105 The legal burden of establishing the existence of a trust is almost certainly on
the party that argues for the trust. See In re  San Diego Realty Exch., Inc., 132 B.R.
424, 428 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991) (“The party alleging that property is held in trust
. . . has the burden of showing the trust relationship.”).
106 Id.  (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n.10 (1983));
see also  11. U.S.C. § 541(b)(1) (“Property of the estate does not include—any power
the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the
debtor . . . .”).  Presumably, the power of a trustee to hold the legal title of the trust
qualifies as “any power” under § 541(b)(1) and thereby places such property out of
the estate entirely.  The Supreme Court in Whiting Pools  was rather curt in its dis-
cussion of § 541(b) but stated:  “We do not now decide the outer boundaries of the
bankruptcy estate.  We note only that Congress plainly excluded property of others
held by the debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the petition.” Whiting Pools ,
462 U.S. at 205 n.10.  Though the Court cited only § 541(b), it is safe to presume that
they were referring to § 541(b)(1), as it is the only subsection that refers to trust-like
structures.
107 11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(1).
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legal title.108
Bankruptcy courts freely recognize that when a debtor holds
property in trust for the benefit of a third party, the beneficial
interests of the trust are excluded from a debtor’s bankruptcy
estate.109  A trust can be either express110 or implied.111  Since
the question of whether there is an enforceable trust is a state
law question112 and there have been diocese filings in three states
to date, beginning in Oregon, this Comment will look first at the
law of Oregon to determine whether the Archdiocese of Portland
has valid trust claims under state law, then briefly examine rele-
vant laws in both Arizona and Washington.  The dioceses might
successfully argue that parish property is held in implied trusts,
but the results are anything but certain.  The general problems
exposed in the following section on Oregon trust law—problems
108 The “bare legal title” argument, though, seems stronger under § 541(d).  Bare
legal title would come into the estate of the diocese and nothing else.  One could
make the argument, however, that if § 541(b) were used, perhaps even bare legal
title would be excluded from the estate.  If holding the legal title to a parcel of land
or bank account is a mere power exercised for the benefit of another, then § 541(b)
would exclude such a holding entirely.  The functional difference between the two
approaches might be nonexistent, however, in that parish property would not be
part of the bankruptcy estate under either approach.
109 This is often described as a bedrock principle of bankruptcy.  Indeed, commen-
tators have noted that “[i]t is a fundamental rule that the estate succeeds only to the
title and rights in the property that the debtor possessed . . . .  Therefore, when a
debtor is in possession of property impressed with an express, constructive, resulting
or statutory trust whose validity is recognized under the terms of the Code, the es-
tate will generally hold such property subject to the outstanding interest of the bene-
ficiaries.  The assets held in trust will thus normally not be available to the debtor or
the debtor’s creditors.” 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 541.11 (15th ed. rev., Lawrence
P. King et al. eds., 1996).  The Supreme Court is in full accord with this proposition.
See Whiting Pools , 462 U.S. at 205 n.10 (“Congress plainly excluded property of
others held by the debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the petition.”).
110 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a (2004) (“When the term ‘trust’ is
used in this Restatement without any qualifying adjective or description, it denotes
. . . an express trust rather than a resulting or constructive trust.”); see also  Lozano v.
Summit Prairie Cattlemens Ass’n, 963 P.2d 92, 95 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (“An express
trust is one in which the circumstances show that the grantor of the property in-
tended to create a trust.”).
111 In re  Hixon, 295 B.R. 866, 871 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003) (“An implied trust is a
legal remedy available where no express agreement exists.”).
112 See  Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are
created and defined by state law.  Unless some federal interest requires a different
result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply
because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”); see also In re
San Diego Realty, 132 B.R. 424, 428 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991) (“Whether a trust has
been created is generally determined under state law.”).
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of intent, proof, and the large task of establishing the existence of
multiple trusts—will remain constant for each diocese.
2. Oregon Trust Law
Trusts are generally recognized under Oregon Law in two
forms:  express and implied.  “Express trusts are intentionally
created by a direct and positive act of the settlor by some writing,
deed, will, or declaration.”113  It should be clear at the outset that
no express trusts exist between the Archdiocese of Portland and
its parishes.  If such trusts existed, it goes without saying that the
Portland Archdiocese would simply point to the trusts’ existence,
and that would be the end of the matter under §§ 541(b) or (d).
As such, any potential trusts between the Portland Archdio-
cese and its parishes would almost certainly be implied trusts, of
which there are two varieties.  The first variety is the constructive
trust, which “‘arises where a conveyance is induced on the agree-
ment of a fiduciary or confident to hold in trust for a recoveyance
or other purpose . . . and where the agreement is breached
. . . .’”114  Constructive trusts are more remedies than true
“trusts” per se and generally arise in response to equitable con-
cerns.115  Clearly, there is no need of a constructive trust remedy
between the Portland Archdiocese and its parishes.  There has
been no breach of agreement asserted between the Portland
Archdiocese and any of its parishes and no violation of a duty
owed,116 much less the need for equitable remedy between dio-
cese and parish.
The second type of implied trust is known as a resulting trust,
which is proven under Oregon law thusly:
A resulting trust is not established by virtue of any expressed
agreement or contract. Rather it arises under the doctrine of
presumed intent that the party who furnished the purchase
price of a parcel of land contemplated that such property
would inure to his own benefit and not that of the record title
holder  and that the title was taken in the name of another for
113 Shipe v. Hillman, 292 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1955).
114 Id.  at 127 (quoting 54 AM. JUR. Trusts , § 233).
115 76 AM. JUR. 2d Trusts  § 168 (2006) (“A ‘constructive trust’ is an implied trust
arising by operation of law to satisfy the demands of justice or to prevent a failure of
justice. . . . A constructive trust arises when equity so demands; it is an equitable
remedy imposed by the courts.”).
116 See Hollen v. Fitzwater, 865 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that
an important element of a constructive trust is “a violation of a duty imposed by [a
preexisting fiduciary] relationship”).
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some incidental purpose.117
Clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence is required to
prove the intent to create a resulting trust, but such evidence can
be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence, including the
conduct of the parties.118  The party seeking to establish the exis-
tence of a resulting trust bears this evidentiary burden.119  Ore-
gon’s concept of a resulting trust seems to be in accord with the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts:  “Where the owner of property
makes a donative transfer and manifests an intention that the
transferee is to hold the property in trust but the intended trust
fails in whole or in part . . . the transferee holds the trust estate
. . . for the transferor or the transferor’s successors in interest
. . . .”120
Although Oregon’s statute of frauds seems to require that
trust agreements regarding real property be in writing,121 “result-
ing trusts are an exception to the requirements of the statute of
frauds.”122
Consequently, if it could be established by clear, unequivocal,
and convincing evidence for each parish within the Archdiocese
of Portland that the parish paid for the property (as a private
landowner generally would); contemplated that the property
would inure to the parish’s benefit, not the archdiocese’s; and
that title was taken by the archdiocese for some incidental pur-
pose (perhaps the parish is unincorporated and incapable of
117 Certified Mortgage Co. v. Shepherd, 838 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Or. Ct. App. 1992)
(citing Hurlbutt v. Hurlbutt, 585 P.2d 724, 726 (1978)).
118 Id.  at 1086.
119 Shipe v. Hillman, 292 P.2d 123, 127 (Or. 1955).
120 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 8 (2004). There are two exceptions in
§ 8 that should be mentioned but seem inapplicable to the cases at hand.  The rest of
§ 8 states that a resulting trust is not created if either “(a) the transferor manifested
an intention that a resulting trust should not arise, or (b) the trust fails for illegality
and the policy against permitting unjust enrichment of a transferee is outweighed by
the policy against giving relief to one who has entered into an illegal transaction.”
Section 8(a) would not come into play since the “transferor” in a diocese case would
be a parish that was trying to keep its assets.  Section 8(b) seems inapplicable, too.
While it may be argued that the bankruptcy cases were brought on by “illegal ac-
tions,” namely, alleged sexual abuse, and that the parishes and the diocese should
not be granted relief because of this, the alleged illegal actions are entirely unrelated
to the creation of any trusts.
121 OR. REV. STAT. § 93.020(1) (2003).
122 In re  Wilder, 42 B.R. 6, 8 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984). See also OR. REV. STAT.
§ 93.020(2) (2003) (“This section does not . . . prevent a trust from arising or being
extinguished by implication or operation of law, nor to affect the power of a court to
compel the specific performance of an agreement in relation to such property.”).
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owning land), such parish property might possibly be held in a
resulting trust by the Portland Archdiocese.  Bankruptcy courts
seated in Oregon have had no trouble recognizing Oregon’s con-
cept of resulting trusts.123  Thus, it is entirely possible that Ore-
gon law could recognize that individual parish property is not
part of the Portland Archdiocese’s bankruptcy estate.
Canon law’s framework could help to support an inference
about the intent of the parties involved.  Recall that under canon
law, property that has been acquired by a parish belongs to the
parish.124  It is quite possible that the unincorporated parishes in
the Portland area wholly intended the Portland Archdiocese to
hold title to property the parishes themselves were unable to
hold.
At this point, counterarguments might arise.  One could argue,
citing the example of the Boston Archdiocese’s $100 million
property sale and closure of individual parishes, that canon law
does not support the trust argument forwarded above.125   Alter-
natively, one might argue that dioceses across the country only
follow canon law when it is convenient and will close or sell off
parishes when necessary.  Thus, canon law should lack persuasive
force in this case because it is impossible to determine with cer-
tainty what canon law actually means.  Certainly, the Boston
Archdiocese was aware of canon law yet still closed some of its
parishes.  The Portland Archdiocese would have good responses
for this argument.
First, the only property the Boston Archdiocese sold to fund
its settlement was property actually owned by the diocese itself,
not any particular parish.126  As such, an argument based on this
property sale alone is not harmful to the claim that parish prop-
erty is held in trust.  In a larger sense, however, the actions of the
Boston Archdiocese can hardly be said to impute liability on the
Portland Archdiocese directly.  Portland’s leadership was entirely
unconnected to the land transfer in question.
123 In re  Wilder, 42 B.R. at 8.
Oregon courts of equity have long recognized that when one acquires prop-
erty as the agent of another upon a confidence that he will hold it for the
other’s benefit a trust will be implied.  A resulting trust occurs when, al-
though no violation of trust or fraud is involved, the circumstances indicate
an intent of the parties that title in one be held for the benefit of another.
Id.  (citing Belton v. Buesing, 402 P.2d 98 (Or. 1965)).
124 CODE OF CANON LAW, 1983 CODE c.1256.
125 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
126 See  Barnett & Kosseff, supra note 18.
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Second, and perhaps more important, the arguments that ei-
ther the Boston Archdiocese was not following canon law when
it ordered parish closings or assets sales or that canon law is not
what the Portland Archdiocese might claim it is would likely also
be of no avail to detractors.  According to published reports, the
Boston Archdiocese is closing and selling off parishes.127  The
same objection noted above, that the Portland and Boston Arch-
dioceses are independent entities, still applies; even if Boston’s
Archdiocese did violate canon law, such a violation is uncon-
nected to Portland’s Archdiocese.
Stronger still is the argument that canon law is not violated by
such action.  Canon 515 section 2 gives a bishop the sole author-
ity to “establish, suppress or alter parishes.  He is not to estab-
lish, suppress or notably alter them unless he has consulted the
council of priests.”128  An argument could be made that closing
parishes and selling assets as it becomes necessary to do so is
within the meaning of “alter parishes” in Canon 515 section 2.
Whether this is the correct interpretation is a question that could
be resolved by an internal church tribunal.  If such a determina-
tion were made by a Catholic ecclesiastical tribunal, civil courts
would likely be bound to accept the meaning of such a determi-
nation.  The Supreme Court stated in Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich  that “the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of
the highest ecclesiastical tribunal . . . but must accept such deci-
sions as binding on them, in their application to the religious is-
sues of doctrine or polity before them.”129  Thus, the actions of
the Boston Archdiocese might not have a dispositive influence
on the Portland Archdiocese’s bankruptcy.
Consequently, the Portland Archdiocese could have a success-
ful argument that parish property is not part of its bankruptcy
estate but is rather held in constructive trusts.  The negative as-
pects of this strategy, however, have not yet been discussed.
A large drawback for the Portland Archdiocese that might
prove prohibitive is the necessarily factual nature of a resulting
trust and the time and energy needed to prove that one exists.
Even if a bankruptcy court were willing to accept the possibility
that parish property is held in a large series of resulting trusts,
127 See supra  notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
128 CODE OF CANON LAW, 1983 CODE c.515, § 2.
129 Serbian E. Orthodox v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708 (1976).
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determining which  parish property is actually  held in trust is
bound to be costly and time-consuming.  A bankruptcy judge
would almost certainly have to look at each parish individually
and examine each piece of property or account that is allegedly
held in trust by the archdiocese.  Only then would the judge be
able to come close to a determination that the property is truly
held in a constructive trust.  When one realizes that the Portland
Archdiocese alone oversees 124 parishes,130 the resulting trust
approach offers anything but a quick and overarching decision.
Furthermore, case-by-case examinations carry the very real pos-
sibility that some parish property will be protected under trust
and some will not.  Parish property that is not under trust will be
vulnerable to creditors.
Moreover, even employing a resulting trust argument assumes
that the parishes and the diocese truly intended a civil trust rela-
tionship,131 which is anything but a given.  Resulting trusts re-
quire that there have been an actual transfer from the parish to
the diocese establishing the trust at the time of the property’s
acquisition as well as the intent to so transfer.  Whether such in-
tent was present or such a transfer has ever occurred is uncertain.
Such factual questions would have to be answered in a parish-by-
parish, transaction-by-transaction inquiry.  Furthermore, if a
bishop could decide to “alter” a parish out of existence, one won-
ders if such a trust is only an illusion under civil law.
There is every incentive for the Portland Archdiocese to seek a
more comprehensive bankruptcy solution, one that would lead to
more uniform results and easier-to-apply precedent.  Determin-
ing the true intent of the parties involved in a trust relationship
after the fact is a slippery, fact-intensive inquiry.  A legal theory
that could subvert such litigation is preferable.  Yet if no other
“magic bullet” solution arises that would keep parish property
130 Woodward, supra  note 33.
131 Intent is important as to whether there is a resulting trust:
A resulting trust generally arises when the parties have used ambiguous
language which the court construes as showing a trust intent, or where the
parties have expressed no intent to create a trust by words, but have per-
formed acts from which the court infers that a trust was intended.  Such a
trust attempts to give a vague or incomplete agreement substance that was
originally intended by the parties.
76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts  § 138 (2005) (citations omitted).  A diocese, no doubt, could
seek to prove this intent by references to canon law and adherence to canon law’s
dictates.  If the circumstances so warrant, however, intent in resulting trusts is often
presumed. Id.
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out of the diocese bankruptcy estate, the Portland Archdiocese
should be prepared to find itself knee-deep in the factual ques-
tion of intent if it seeks to keep parish property out of its bank-
ruptcy estate.132  The existence of an overarching solution,
however, is uncertain.
3. Arizona Trust Law
Arizona law also recognizes resulting trusts.  The state’s high-
est court has said that “when property is purchased in the name
of one person with money furnished by another, a resulting trust
arises in favor of the person furnishing the purchase money,”133
and it has cited with approval the earlier Restatement (Second)
of Trusts, which in substance is quite similar to the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts.134
Furthermore, Arizona’s statute of frauds is also susceptible to
a successful resulting trust claim, such that there is no absolute
132 The Portland Archdiocese has already begun this factual inquiry.  The inquiry
will begin with arguments that the parishes are separate entities that have their own
legal existence separate of the archdiocese.  Steve Woodward, Archdiocese Will Ar-
gue Assets are Parish-Specific , OREGONIAN (Portland), Jan. 30, 2005, at B1.  “The
parishes have undertaken ‘an unprecedented factual inquiry’ into their histories,
Douglas Pahl, an attorney for a group of 67 parishes, told Bankruptcy Judge Eliza-
beth Perris at a Dec. 28 hearing.”  Id.  The archdiocese will use ten parishes as “test
cases” to determine the validity of their separate existences. Id.  I believe that this
inquiry will do two things:  First, it will establish the separate existences of the par-
ishes in question, and this existence will probably be akin to the notion of an unin-
corporated association.  Second, it will lay the groundwork for resulting trust
arguments.  There will be a great deal of factual overlap between the questions of
separate existence on the one hand and the establishment of resulting trusts on the
other.  These test cases seem to indicate that the archdiocese will ultimately try to
argue that parish property is held in resulting trusts.  “A court hearing [on the issue
of the parishes’ existence] is scheduled for May 9[, 2005].” Id.
133 Toth v. Toth, 946 P.2d 900, 902 (Ariz. 1997).
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 440 (1959) (“Where a transfer of prop-
erty is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting
trust arises in favor of the person by whom the purchase price is paid, except as
stated in §§ 441, 442 and 444.”).  The exceptions cited are nearly identical to those
mentioned in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts:
As to the circumstances manifesting an intention that no resulting trust
should arise although the purchase price is paid by one person and title is
taken in the name of another, see § 441. As to the effect of a purchase in
the name of a relative, see § 442.  As to the situation where the purchase is
made in order to accomplish an illegal purpose, see § 444.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 440 cmt. a (1959).  For the language and dis-
cussion of the relevant portion of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, see supra  note
120 and accompanying text.
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requirement that a trust agreement be in writing.135  Conse-
quently, if the Tucson Diocese sought to claim that its parishes’
assets were held in resulting trusts, it might succeed entirely, suc-
ceed partially, or fail, but the inquiry would be, in all likelihood,
extended and costly for the same reasons that apply to the Port-
land Archdiocese.  All of the general problems with this strategy
mentioned earlier still hold true.
4. Washington Trust Law
Washington state law seems to be largely in accord with both
Oregon and Arizona law on the question of resulting trusts.136
Washington, however, has slightly different language in a particu-
lar statute that pertains to property held in trusts by religious
organizations.  The statute in question, Washington Revised Code
section 24.12.030, deals with the succession of bishops or other
presiding elders who make up the membership of a church or-
ganized as a corporation under state law.137  This statute ex-
pressly provides that property held in trust by a religious
corporation shall continue to be held in trust, regardless of the
succession of a new church leader.138
There is virtually no case law interpreting this statute,139 but
even in the worst-case scenario for the Spokane Diocese, it seems
unlikely that the issue of church leader succession and the result-
ing effect on trust property should influence whether a resulting
trust exists.  As such, a bankruptcy court seated in Washington
could easily come to the same answer that the bankruptcy courts
in Arizona and Oregon could in terms of the existence of a series
135 Gabitzsch v. Cole, 386 P.2d 23, 26 (Ariz. 1963) (“A trust created by operation
of law is not within the Statute of Frauds.” (citing Collins v. Collins, 52 P.2d 1169
(Ariz. 1935))).
136 Bucsko v. O’Farrell, 12 P.2d 405, 405 (Wash. 1932) (“If the unwritten contract
were one to transfer an interest in the land to be acquired, it would be within the
statute of frauds and unenforceable unless the respondent could establish a resulting
trust, growing out of the use of his money in making the purchase . . . .”).
137 “Provided , [a]ll property held in such official capacity . . . shall be in trust for
the use, purpose, benefit and behoof of his religious denomination, society or
church.” WASH. REV. CODE. § 24.12.030 (West 1994).  When a new bishop takes
over, “it shall be sufficient to file with the secretary of state the original or a copy of
his commission . . . .” Id.
138 Id.
139 The only case mentioned in association with this statute seems to precede the
enactment of the statute itself. See Wilkeson v. Rector of St. Luke’s Parish, 29 P.2d
748 (Wash. 1934).
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of resulting trusts.  Yet again, this argument is nowhere near an
optimal solution.
5. Conclusion on Trusts
It is at least possible, if not likely, that a great deal of individ-
ual parish property, whether liquid funds or real estate, could be
found to be held in valid trusts under the state laws of Oregon,
Arizona, and Washington.  Yet the resulting litigation that would
be required to prove each and every resulting trust would be ex-
tensive, if not prohibitive.  The results could be excellent, mixed,
or negative for the dioceses.  A resulting trust argument, there-
fore, would be best used as a last resort.  If the dioceses get to the
point where this argument is the only option left, the prudent
move might be to renew settlement discussions.  There is, how-
ever, at least one other legal argument suggested by canon law’s
structure.
B. Parishes as Corporations
Each of the three dioceses that have filed for bankruptcy is
recognized under state law as “corporations sole” with a bishop
or archbishop as the sole member of the corporation.140  It seems
clear that parishes are not incorporated separately.  If they were,
the property of the estate question would be somewhat academic
and uninteresting.  Barring a successful corporate veil-piercing
argument, parish assets would be safe, and only the assets of the
diocese itself and the parish where the alleged abuse took place
would be vulnerable.  The status of parishes under canon law as
juridical persons invites a comparison with civil incorporation
law141 and could lead one to wonder if civil law would recognize
140 See OR. REV. STAT. § 65.067 (2003):
(1) Any individual may, in conformity with the constitution, canons, rules,
regulations and disciplines of any church or religious denomination, form a
corporation hereunder to be a corporation sole. Such corporation shall be a
form of religious corporation and will differ from other such corporations
organized hereunder only in that it shall have no board of directors, need
not have officers and shall be managed by a single director who shall be the
individual constituting the corporation and its incorporator or the successor
of the incorporator.
(2) The name of such corporation shall be the same as the office within the
church or religious denomination held by the incorporator, and shall be
followed by the words “and successors, a corporation sole.”
See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-11901 (2004);  WASH. REV. CODE § 24.12.010
(2004).
141 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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the separate corporate existence of individual parishes.  While
the answer appears to be no, the rationale behind this answer is
worth briefly exploring.
1. General Requirements for Corporate Status Without Filing
Generally speaking, unless a corporation is created under “the
governing statutory provisions, an organization or association has
no legal existence as a corporation . . . . However, a bona fide
attempt to organize a corporation under a valid existing statute
authorizing the creation of a corporation . . . will result in the
creation of a de facto corporation . . . .”142  Thus, corporate status
is possible without filing the appropriate articles of incorporation
with the state of residence.  The requirements of de facto corpo-
rate status are the existence of a valid incorporation statute;143 a
bona fide, good faith attempt to incorporate;144 and a failure to
comply with the particular state requirements145 (though some
jurisdictions have allowed an organization not to file incorpora-
tions papers at all),146 as well as other nominal requirements.
Thus, it seems as if individual parishes could theoretically have
claims of actual corporate status.
Yet such status is all but impossible.  First, it does not appear
that any dioceses have actually attempted to incorporate sepa-
rately.  Perhaps this is due to the general feeling that canon law
determined their individual statuses, but this is merely specula-
tive.  Second, if one were to go down the list of elements of de
facto corporations, one would likely find that parishes do not
meet the required elements.  Third, and most important for the
dioceses that have filed for bankruptcy to date, in certain states
that have adopted the Model Business Corporations Act, courts
have held that the adoption of the Act abolished the doctrine of
de facto corporate status entirely.147  Among the states that have
appeared to rule this way are Oregon148 and Arizona.149
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel, which is somewhat
142 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations  § 188 (2004).
143 Id. § 194.
144 Id.  § 195.
145 Id.  § 196.
146 Id.  § 197.
147 Id.  § 191.
148 See  Sherwood & Roberts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander, 525 P.2d 135, 138 (Or.
1974).
149 See  Booker Custom Packing Co. v. Sallomi, 716 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986).
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related to de facto corporate status, will also be unavailing.  Cor-
poration by estoppel arises when individuals deal with a business
organization as if it were a corporation and are thereafter es-
topped from denying its corporate existence.150  “A corporation
by estoppel may result from the parties’ agreement or conduct
that estops them from later denying the corporation’s exis-
tence.”151  Alleged tort victims, however, can hardly be said to
have dealt with a parish as if it were a corporation.  Even more
generally, the initial interaction between a tortfeasor and a victim
occurs on the date of the tort itself.  It would seem unlikely that a
corporation by estoppel would even be possible in a tort case
other than by agreement.  Thus, it seems highly unlikely that a
tort victim would be estopped from asserting such a claim under
the corporation by estoppel doctrine.  Consequently, the doctrine
has no application in the instant cases.
C. Summary
Any civilly recognized corporate status that might have been
invited by canon law’s structure is illusory.  Likewise, parishes
will be unable to claim that they are separate corporate entities.
Barring a legal ruling that canon law governs the matter entirely,
the argument that parishes should be recognized as corporations
would have fleeting legal consequence.
Returning to the ultimate question of what property belongs in
a diocese’s bankruptcy estate, there is some chance of sheltering
parish assets, but working within the framework of the Bank-
ruptcy Code will make for an uphill battle.  The resulting trust
argument could possibly shelter a great deal of parish assets, but
it would cost a large amount in time and litigation, and the ulti-
mate outcome would still be uncertain for each parish.  Any at-
tempt to claim separate corporate status for the individual
parishes seems impossible.
IV
APPLYING CANON LAW AS CONTROLLING PRECEDENT
Each diocese that has filed for bankruptcy claims that parish
assets belong to the parishes, not the diocese.  Stating in a bank-
ruptcy petition that property is held in the name of the debtor
150 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations  § 209 (2004).
151 Id.
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actually grants the debtor no equitable ownership in the property
absent a valid trust agreement because the Code of Canon Law’s
provisions implicitly, if not explicitly, assume that canon law is
relevant as a body of governing law that must be given deference
by a bankruptcy court.152  The question then arises:  would it be
possible for a bankruptcy court to defer directly to canon law to
solve the question of parish property ownership?  The idea is cer-
tainly novel but, perhaps, not impossible.  After all, as experts
have noted, the difference between civil law’s and canon law’s
conceptions of property ownership is rather definitional in na-
ture—amounting to a “conflicting notion of ownership.”153  If
one form of ownership, canon law ownership, carried civil law
effect, or if civil courts deferred directly to canon law on ques-
tions of property ownership, parish assets would be free from a
diocese’s bankruptcy estate.
Applying canon law would be controversial, but controversy
alone does not preclude a legal outcome.  Applying canon law as
the controlling legal rule could be the type of overarching “magic
bullet” legal theory that would exclude all parish property at
once.  Current case law, however, seems to preclude canon law’s
direct application and will likewise preclude civil courts from giv-
ing canon law dispositive deference.
A. Court Rulings
A search for bankruptcy cases in which canon or religious laws
are dispositive, or even considered to be dispositive, reveals little
precedent.  In the cases that do arise, bankruptcy courts seem
loathe to discuss canon law at all.  For example, in In re Carmel
of St. Joseph of Santa Ynez , a bankruptcy appellate panel re-
viewed a case concerning, in part, an implied promise based on
canon law.154  The panel made clear that its ruling was in no way
based on canon law:  “We are not saying that there was an im-
plied agreement based on Canon law.  Furthermore, we are not
152 See  Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization at 48-49, In re  The Diocese of Tucson,
No. 4-04-04721 (D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2004) (“Upon completion of the incorporation an
establishment of the corporate existence of each such Parish, the Diocese, as part of
the Plan, will convey legal title to the Parish Real Property to each Parish that is the
owner of such Parish Property .”) (emphasis added).  The implication from this sen-
tence is that the parishes themselves must own the property to be transferred, re-
gardless of the status under civil law.
153 Haught, supra note 90.
154 In re  Carmel of St. Joseph of Santa Ynez, 237 B.R. 155, 159 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1999).
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saying that Canon law would ever be controlling law.”155  After
reviewing Supreme Court precedent on canon law, it should be-
come clear that the Carmel of St. Joseph panel’s reluctance to
apply canon law or to base a decision on it is well founded.
The Supreme Court has held that civil courts should not inter-
fere with or overturn properly determined decisions regarding
the application of church laws in instances of internal church dis-
pute.  In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich , the
Illinois Supreme Court struck down a church’s defrocking of a
priest as well as its plan to split a diocese into three new dioceses
because the court, in interpreting the religious law governing the
church, decided that the defrocking and reorganization were im-
proper under the church’s law despite an earlier adjudication by
the church’s ecclesiastical court to the contrary.156
The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating that the
Illinois court had impermissibly rejected the ecclesiastical court’s
judgment that the church’s actions had been proper under church
law.157  The foundation for this decision was the Court’s pro-
nouncement that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments man-
date that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal . . . but must accept such decisions as bind-
ing on them, in their application to the religious issues of doc-
trine or policy before them.”158  “In short, the First and
Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organiza-
tions to establish their own rules and regulations for internal dis-
cipline and government,”159 and once a church tribunal is
established and rules on an issue of internal dispute, “the Consti-
tution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding
upon them.”160  Internal church disputes, therefore, are within
the sole purview of church jurisdiction.  Ecclesiastical courts are
free to decide such issues, and civil courts may not reverse these
decisions without running afoul of the Constitution.
One should immediately recognize two reasons why Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese  would not help those Catholic dio-
ceses that have filed for bankruptcy to date.  First, in Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese , the Illinois Supreme Court had
155 Id. at 159 n.3.
156 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 698 (1976).
157 Id. at 708.
158 Id.  at 709.
159 Id. at 724.
160 Id.  at 725.
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looked too deeply into church decisions and had thusly meddled
too deeply in church affairs.  No Catholic diocese that has filed
for bankruptcy has cited to a decision by an internal church body
stating that parish property is not owned by a diocese.  As such,
there is no ecclesiastical court decision with which a civil court
could meddle.
Second, and more important, a subsequent decision by then-
Justice Rehnquist recognized that while internal disputes decided
under church law are entitled to deference, a decision on third-
party disputes involving mainly secular concerns will not be ac-
cepted so readily.  In General Council on Finance and Adminis-
tration of the Methodist Church v. California Superior Court,
County of San Diego ,161 Justice Rehnquist, acting singly as circuit
justice, denied a motion to stay a California state court case in
which a church wanted to petition the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari.  In so doing, Justice Rehnquist rejected an
expansive reading of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese .
While a civil court is extremely limited in how deeply it may
look into “matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity in adju-
dicating intrachurch disputes[,] . . . [the Supreme] Court never
has suggested that those constraints similarly apply outside the
context of such intraorganization[al] disputes.”162  The rationale
underlying Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese  was that courts
would become “entangled in essentially religious controversies
or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal
beliefs. . . . Such considerations are not applicable to purely secu-
lar disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, al-
beit a religious affiliated organization, in which fraud, breach of
contract, and statutory violations are alleged.”163  Following this
pronouncement, at least one court has held that General Council
stands for the proposition that “limits on the court’s power are
confined to intra-church disputes” alone.164  There is no indica-
tion that the current United States Supreme Court would not
rule in the same way Chief Justice Rehnquist did in deciding the
motion presented in General Council .
Other courts have arrived at similar decisions in determining
which disputes are and which disputes are not internal church
161 439 U.S. 1355 (1978).
162 Id. at 1372.
163 Id.  at 1373 (citation omitted).
164 Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 455 n.6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE405.txt unknown Seq: 37  6-APR-06 12:26
Is the “Pot of Gold” Really Empty? 1217
disputes, holding, for example, that normal tort claims are not
prohibited by the First Amendment.165  Any other ruling might
potentially immunize church organizations entirely from tort lia-
bility.  Even though lower court rulings do not carry the full force
of Supreme Court precedent, the logic of such cases is hard to
dispute.  It seems apparent, therefore, that while internal church
disputes may be decided by church or canon laws, the introduc-
tion of a third-party legal dispute would be fairly certain to strip
canon law of dispositive force.
While church bankruptcy cases have elements common to in-
ternal church disputes, in light of General Council , it would be
extremely unlikely that civil courts would defer to a nonexistent
Catholic court determination of parish property ownership.
Consequently, unless the Supreme Court should take up the op-
portunity to announce a new direction in its judicial philosophy
as it pertains to the interplay of church and civil laws, it is un-
likely that Catholic canon law will decide the outcome of the
bankruptcy cases.
B. Conclusion
The direct application of canon law to a bankruptcy case is the
least likely legal outcome of any discussed in this Comment.  If
the lack of an ecclesiastical court decision does not halt such an
application, First Amendment concerns probably would.
V
EXPRESS TRUST AGREEMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL
PARISH INCORPORATION:  THE PATHS
NOT TAKEN
Regardless of the outcomes of the cases currently in the bank-
ruptcy court, there are measures that other dioceses might take
to ensure that canon law’s structure is recognized under civil law.
It should be noted, however, that the following arguments will be
165 See, e.g. , Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo. 1993).  The
court stated that:
Application of a secular standard to secular conduct that is tortious is not
prohibited by the Constitution.  The Supreme Court has not granted
churches broad immunity against being sued in civil courts.  Civil actions
against clergy members and their superiors that involve claims of a breach
of fiduciary duty, negligent hiring and supervision, and vicarious liability
are actionable if they are supported by competent evidence in the record.
(citations omitted).
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of little use to those dioceses that have already filed for bank-
ruptcy.  The bankruptcy estate is comprised of all legal or equita-
ble interests of the debtor at the commencement of the
bankruptcy case.166  Any measures taken to secure the indepen-
dent legal status of the parishes after filing a petition for bank-
ruptcy or that sought to make express trust provisions indicating
the true nature of parish property would almost certainly be too
late to affect the outcome of those dioceses already in bank-
ruptcy.  The failure to take advantage of the structures and de-
vices offered by civil law is likely to severely hamper efforts by
dioceses to keep parish property out of their bankruptcy estates.
Thus, what follows in this Part is merely general advice for the
multitude of remaining dioceses that they should not let the same
fate befall them.
A. Express Trust Agreements
As discussed earlier, none of the dioceses seem able to appeal
to any existing express trust agreements,167 thereby necessitating
resulting trust arguments.  Other dioceses should strongly con-
sider executing express trust agreements with their parishes,
which could solidify in civil law the ownership status recognized
by canon law.  While there is certain to be a great deal of state
law variation on the creation of trusts, the terms required, and
the like, the basic trust instrument is fairly simple.168  Aside from
the sheer volume of parish properties, setting up express trust
agreements between a diocese and its parishes should be possible
and would certainly be preferable to litigation in a bankruptcy
court.  The obvious ramifications of valid trust agreements would
be, as discussed above, that beneficial ownership of the property
held in trust would not become part of the bankruptcy estate of a
diocese.169
166 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) (2000).
167 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
168 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2004) (“A trust . . . is a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, arising from a manifestation of intention to
create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to
duties to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least
one of whom is not the sole trustee.”).
169 See supra  Part III.A.1.
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B. Separate Incorporation and Transfer of Legal Title of
Parish Assets to Individual Parishes
Perhaps the most promising solution for the protection of par-
ish assets is separate incorporation of each parish combined with
the transfer of parish assets to each newly created entity.  Had
the parishes within the Portland, Tucson, and Spokane dioceses
been separate corporate entities at the time each filed for bank-
ruptcy, it is quite likely that this Comment would have been writ-
ten on a nonexistent issue.  Those parishes that were
unconnected to alleged abuse would likely not have been liable
in the first place absent some extremely novel corporate veil-
piercing argument,170 and their collective properties, real and
personal, would not have become part of the bankruptcy estate
of the diocese.
The Tucson Diocese believes so strongly in this course of ac-
tion that its bankruptcy reorganization plan declares that it will
incorporate all of its parishes separately and transfer all parish
assets to them as part of its reorganization plan.171  Each parish
will presumably be incorporated as a separate nonprofit corpora-
tion, and all property belonging to a parish will be transferred to
170 Generally speaking, “piercing a corporate veil,” or disregarding corporate sta-
tus, is a rare legal occurrence, which is often determined on a case-by-case basis.  18
AM. JUR. 2D Corporations  § 47 (2004).  It is frequently stated that corporate status is
a privilege and that piercing the veil is invoked as an equitable concept when that
privilege is abused.  Factors that might justify piercing are varied but often include
undercapitalization of a corporation dominated by a shareholder or parent corpora-
tion, fraud, or the like. Id.  § 54.  Piercing a parish’s veil in a suit against a diocese
would be novel on many fronts.  First, a plaintiff would have to attempt to pierce the
veil between a parent and a subsidiary corporation in order to get at the assets of the
subsidiary, not the other way around.  Second, were parishes incorporated, they
would almost certainly be incorporated as nonprofit entities.  Whether piercing the
veil of a nonprofit corporation is even a coherent theory, much less an applicable
theory, is uncertain.
171 Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization at 48-49, In re  The Diocese of Tucson, No. 4-
04-04721 (D. Ariz. 2004).  The plan states:
Prior to the Effective Date, but after the Confirmation Date, each Parish
will be separately incorporated as an Arizona non-profit corporation.
Upon completion of the incorporation and establishment of the corporate
existence of each such Parish, the Diocese, as part of the Plan, will convey
legal title to the Parish Real Property to each Parish that is the owner of
such Parish Property.
Id. For the sake of confirming a point that has been made on multiple occasions in
this Comment, this language again clearly displays the diocese’s position that parish
property is the property of the parishes and that it is civil law’s failure to recognize
this fact that leads to difficulty.
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the new legally incorporated entity.172  Once again, though,
§ 541(a) will likely make the issue of whether parishes have sub-
sequently reincorporated moot since the estate is created upon
filing a bankruptcy petition.  The Tucson Diocese might have at-
tempted to capitalize on an opportunity it had already missed, at
least insofar as keeping parish assets out of its estate calculation
is concerned.  As will be discussed in Part VI.A, The Tucson Dio-
cese’s Chapter 11 plan has been confirmed.  As such, its missed
opportunity is of less consequence at this time.
Interestingly, separate parish incorporation might have a nega-
tive long-term effect on parishes.  If abuse is alleged to occur in a
parish, then, presumably, the parish itself, as a separately incor-
porated entity, would be sued as a co-defendant with a diocese.
If a newly incorporated parish and its diocese were the only enti-
ties funding the legal defense, a single large judgment or a series
of smaller judgments could easily bankrupt a parish.  As a sepa-
rately incorporated entity, however, a parish would be able to file
for bankruptcy itself should the need arise.173
While it would be a lamentable state of affairs if incorporated
parishes were required to file for bankruptcy because of meritori-
ous abuse suits, the solution to the more general problem of
abuse lawsuits, the alleged abuse itself, will not be found in the
Bankruptcy Code.  Ultimately, the most certain way for a diocese
and its parishes to guarantee that the structure that canon law
erects—separate parish ownership of assets—is honored under
civil law is for parishes to incorporate separately.  There is no
legal impediment within civil or canon law standing in the way of
parish incorporation.
C. Summary
The most workable and practical answers for parishes seeking
to protect parish assets is to set up express trust agreements, to
incorporate separately and transfer title to assets, or to use some
combination of both.  From a diocesan perspective, perhaps the
only positive thing to emerge from the current bankruptcy cases
will be greater awareness of civil law’s protections on the part of
dioceses and parishes.
172 Id.  at 49 (“Each Parish that is separately incorporated will be operated and
governed in accordance with Canon Law.”).
173 Chapter 11 protection should be available to an incorporated parish. See 11
U.S.C. § 109(d) (2000).
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VI
PLAN CONFIRMATION AND BANKRUPTCY COURT
RULINGS:  THE EARLY RESULTS
All three of the dioceses that filed for bankruptcy in 2004 have
since come to some tentative resolution in their bankruptcy
cases.  One proceeded to a bankruptcy plan that was confirmed
by a court, while the other two litigated through the bankruptcy
courts with negative results.
A. Tucson Confirms its Plan
On July 11, 2005, a bankruptcy judge in Tucson, Arizona con-
firmed the Chapter 11 reorganization plan of the Tucson Dio-
cese.174  The resolution made Tucson the first of the dioceses to
settle its bankruptcy case.  Under the plan, a $22.2 million trust
was established to compensate abuse victims, most of whom will
receive between $15,000 and $600,000.175  The fourteen most se-
verely abused victims will share a pot of approximately $6.8 mil-
lion with no individual member taking less than $200,000.176
In a move that underscores the problems with the applicability
of the canon law arguments outlined in this Comment, the Tuc-
son Diocese also included as part of its bankruptcy plan to incor-
porate all seventy-four of its parishes separately as nonprofit
entities.177  Tucson was not the first diocese to take this step, as
separate parish incorporation had happened previously in Baker,
Oregon; Davenport, Iowa; Lincoln, Nebraska; Milwaukee, Wis-
consin; New York, New York; Providence, Rhode Island; and
Stockton, California.178  Given the initial outcomes in Portland
and Spokane and the analysis laid out herein, parish incorpora-
tion is a wise move and is the only move certain to gain civil law
recognition for individual parishes, which is an obvious precursor
to legal property ownership.
B. Spokane and Portland Lose Bankruptcy Court Rulings
The Spokane Diocese brought several initial arguments to the
174 Susan Hines-Brigger, Judge O.K.’s Reorganization Plan for Tucson Diocese ,
ST. ANTHONY MESSENGER, Sept. 1, 2005, at 2005 WLNR 14755110.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Tucson Parishes Become Independent Corporations , Sept. 10, 2005, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, at 2005 WLNR 14394420.
178 Id.
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bankruptcy court that each relied heavily on the structure of ca-
non law to support its propositions that parish properties were
not part of its bankruptcy estate or, in the alternative, that trusts
had been created for the parishes’ benefit.  On August 26, 2005,
Bankruptcy Judge Patricia Williams ruled on these issues.179
Judge Williams’ ruling came as a blow to the diocese’s position.
With respect to the application of canon law, the diocese relied
on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and prior
case law to argue that allowing § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code to
define parish property as part of the diocese’s bankruptcy estate
constituted an undue burden on religion under both RFRA and
the First Amendment.  Noting first the uniqueness and novelty of
the diocese’s argument180 and also that the bankruptcy dispute
was between the diocese and third parties, not internal church
members,181 Judge Williams ruled that “[a]pplication of § 541 to
[the Spokane Diocese] on the same basis as its application to all
other debtors does not interfere with the free exercise of relig-
ion.”182  Consequently, the application of civil, not canon, law
posed no constitutional or RFRA problems.
Judge Williams then addressed the various express and implied
trust issues raised by the diocese.  In ruling on whether the dio-
cese had ever created express trusts for its parishes, Judge Wil-
liams recognized that the Spokane Diocese’s articles of
incorporation had indeed created an express trust, but instead of
creating a trust for its parishes, the Diocese had created an ex-
press trust naming itself—the Roman Catholic Church of the Di-
ocese of Spokane in the State of Washington—as the
beneficiary.183  Thus, Judge Williams ruled that “[t]he Bishop, as
trustee, holds the property in trust for the Diocese”184 and, con-
sequently, not in express trust for the parishes.  Second, after an-
alyzing both types of implied trusts—constructive and
resulting—Judge Williams concluded that the facts did not estab-
lish the existence of an implied trust for the benefit of parishio-
179 In re  The Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
2005).
180 Id.  at 321 (“The proposition that the rights of creditors of religious organiza-
tions are to be determined in accordance with ecclesiastical doctrine of the religious
organization is perhaps not quite as astounding as it first appears.”).
181 Id.  at 323 (“This is a purely secular dispute between creditors and a bank-
ruptcy debtor, albeit one which is a religious organization.”).
182 Id.  at 325.
183 Id.  at 327-28.
184 Id.  at 328.
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ners185 nor, with respect to parish real property, was there
evidence of implied trusts.186
This ruling was a blow to the Spokane Diocese, as it appeared
to dismiss each of the diocese’s canon law arguments systemati-
cally.  It does not appear, however, that this ruling will be the last
word.  The Spokane Diocese immediately appealed to the next
highest court, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington.187  In the meantime, it has proposed a
Chapter 11 plan as well.188
On December 30, 2005, Portland Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth
Perris ruled on the Portland Archdiocese’s bankruptcy estate
question in much the same way that Spokane’s Judge Williams
did.  For instance, Judge Perris stated that:
Neutral principles of law require application of secular neutral
principles, not sacred ones.  The religious organization’s inter-
nal law is not relevant to the dispute, unless neutral principles
of civil law make it so.  There is no constitutional requirement
that internal church law be considered in determining a purely
secular dispute.189
Judge Perris also cited Judge Williams’ ruling with approval on
this point.190
In ruling on the archdiocese’s RFRA arguments, Judge Perris,
with respect to the potential burden § 541 might place on relig-
ion, first questioned whether RFRA even applies to a simple de-
termination statute like § 541, which merely defines estate
property by reference to relevant state law.191  Yet Judge Perris
ultimately concluded that even if RFRA did apply to the  § 541
estate determination, such a determination did not violate
185 Id.  at 330 (“No constructive or resulting trust exists for the benefit of individ-
ual parishioners.”).
186 Id.  at 331 (“There is no evidence to support the creation of a constructive or
resulting trust with regard to the Disputed Real Property.”).  Judge Williams, how-
ever, did rule that there were factual questions with respect to disputed personal
property, namely, funds and investment accounts. Id. at 331-32.
187 Matt Miller, Spokane Ruling:  Blow to Canon Law , THE DAILY DEAL, Aug.
30, 2005, at 2005 WLNR 13602810.
188 John Stucke, Diocese Offers Abuse Claim Plan:  Payout Fund Soars to $57.5
Million; Process Questioned , Spokesman-Review (Spokane, Wash.), Dec. 31, 2005,
available at  2005 WLNR 22322813.
189 In re  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 835 B.R. 842, 854, 2005
WL 3618347 at * 6 (Bankr. D. Or. 2005).
190 Id.  (citing In re The Catholic Diocese of Spokane, 329 B.R. 304, 326 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. 2005) ).
191 Id.  at 860.
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RFRA.192
Finally, Judge Perris ruled that the various Portland Archdio-
cese parishes, save for one that had separately incorporated it-
self, “cannot hold title to real property.  They are not separate
from, but are merely a part of debtor.”193  Consequently, the civil
law structure chosen by the archdiocese (i.e., keeping its parishes
unincorporated) dictated that the parishes were not capable of
holding real property or of being trust beneficiaries.194  If one
accepts that Judge Perris is correct about the nature of the par-
ishes—that they are legally part of the archdiocese itself and
have no independent legal existence—this conclusion is self-evi-
dent.  A corporation certainly cannot hold assets in trust for an-
other part of itself and hope to gain a shield of civil liability in the
process.
C. Summary
The initial bankruptcy court rulings have been negative for the
dioceses.  It remains to be seen how far potential appeals will be
taken or whether the Spokane and Portland Dioceses will simply
follow the lead of Tucson toward a confirmed Chapter 11 plan.
Given the monetary size of the Portland Archdiocese, however,
if parish property is part of the archdiocese’s estate, it would not
be surprising if the archdiocese appealed.  Judge Perris’ ruling
gives more bargaining power to the archdiocese’s creditors in
terms of securing a more favorable plan.
CONCLUSION
One can only hope that the underlying meritorious suits alleg-
ing sexual abuse against dioceses and individual bad actors
within the church come to successful resolutions for all parties
involved—for every possible reason.  The financial, temporal,
and monetary commitments of such legal actions are difficult to
measure but are certainly taxing to all those involved.
This Comment has discussed a number of issues, including the
uniqueness of a diocesan bankruptcy petition as it pertains to a
diocesan bankruptcy estate, the dioceses’ arguments as to why
parish property should not be part of a diocesan bankruptcy es-
tate, the relevant law surrounding bankruptcy estate questions,
192 Id. at 861.
193 Id.  at 866.
194 Id.  at 867.
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and the opportunities the dioceses had to protect parish assets
successfully.  Given the legal status of parish assets, the difficulty
in arguing for legally recognized trusts, the virtual impossibility
that parishes can be recognized as separate corporations, and the
unlikely prospect of applying canon law directly in bankruptcy, it
is probable that a great deal of parish property, if not all of it, will
become part of the bankruptcy estates of the Archdiocese of
Portland and the Diocese of Spokane.
This does not seem to be an unjust result.  Corporate status is
relatively simple to acquire, as dioceses themselves have discov-
ered and acted on by availing themselves of the unique corpora-
tion sole status granted to them by state legislatures.  Legal trusts
are also relatively simple instruments.  Either of these ap-
proaches could have shielded parish assets.  The failure of dio-
ceses to use these legal protections should serve as a lesson to
other dioceses to protect the structures that they believe exist
within canon law, namely, that of parishes as separate juridical
persons who own property in their own right.  Judge Elizabeth
Perris espoused a similar position when discussing the Portland
Archdiocese’s canon law claims and its one separately incorpo-
rated parish:
[The Portland Archdiocese] has chosen to organize its opera-
tions under a corporation sole.  It chose to separately incorpo-
rate (or allow the separate incorporation of) St. Elizabeth
Parish; it could have also chosen to incorporate the other par-
ishes as religious corporations, by which they would gain a
civil legal status and could exercise the powers granted to such
corporations, including the power to hold and dispose of prop-
erty and to sue and be sued.  [The archdiocese] did not, how-
ever, choose to do that, and gives no reason why it could not,
under state law, have separately incorporated the parishes or
in some other way organized itself to protect canonical owner-
ship rights, if any, of the schools and parishes.  The existence
of St. Elizabeth Parish is evidence that such incorporation is
possible and acceptable.195
The dioceses have apparently not considered it worthwhile to
take full advantage of these protections for their parishes—as
can be inferred from the facts that the vast majority of parishes
are not separately incorporated and that there are no express
trust agreements specifically naming the parishes as beneficiaries.
Furthermore, it is certainly difficult to prove a series of resulting
195 Id.  at 867-68.
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trusts on a massive scale.  It would be inequitable if parishes re-
ceived legal protection in bankruptcy—protection that was al-
ways available to them—without performing the necessary steps
to acquire the protection.
This is not to say that there are not sympathetic parties on both
sides of the lawsuits against the dioceses.  One obviously has
sympathy for the victims of past sexual abuse.  Certainly, it is un-
fortunate that a parish that had nothing to do with alleged abuse
might have its assets put in jeopardy at the hands of a few ex-
tremely bad actors in another parish, especially when it seems
clear that canon law would protect parish assets from the liabili-
ties of other parishes or the diocese if canon law were to govern
the civil dispute.  Yet it goes without saying that foresight is far
more legally effective than hindsight.  Nowhere is this truer than
in the context of shields of legal liability.  The failure to plan ade-
quately for future outcomes will result in financial detriment to
the parishes, which will quite likely bear some of the financial
brunt of the bankruptcy cases by way of the inclusion of parish
property in the bankruptcy estates of their respective dioceses.
Consequently, the “pot of gold” is probably not empty for those
dioceses presently in bankruptcy court.
